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TAX IN A CHANGING WORLD: THE TRANSFER PRICING OF 
INTANGIBLE ASSETS1 
 
Dr Michelle Markham, Queensland University of Technology 
 
 
 
'What seemed unthinkable 15 or 20 years ago is now a reality. In some respects, the world is 
becoming a single market with businesses from around the world competing for the same 
projects, no matter their geographic location…It is within this context that transfer pricing is 
constantly evolving.'2 
 
'The lack of good information about intangibles leads to…opaqueness, volatility, and 
perceptions of unfairness in capital markets, and it makes designing a fair tax system more 
difficult".3 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
While transfer pricing has risen to the forefront of international tax issues in the last 
two decades, this has coincided with a concomitant increase in the importance of 
intangibles in the global economy. The so-called 'new economy' of the 21st century 
has seen business enterprises, particularly multinational business enterprises, 
divesting themselves of tangible assets while turning to intangible assets to enhance 
their standing in a world increasingly focused on technological innovation. 
 
The spiralling cross-border trade in intangibles has compelled revenue authorities to 
scrutinize the tax treatment of these assets, along with the realisation that traditional 
                                                          
1 This paper was presented at the Tax Research Network Conference, Edinburgh, September 2005.  
2 Brenda J. Humphreys and Saul Plener 'Transfer Pricing for the Owner-Managed Business: Not Just a 
Big Company Problem!' published in the Report of Proceedings of the Fiftieth Tax Conference 
(Canadian Tax Foundation, 1999) p. 40: 2. 
3 Margaret M. Blair and Steven M.H. Wallman Unseen Wealth Report of the Brookings Task Force on 
Intangibles, (Brookings Institution Press Washington, D.C. 2001) p. 3. 
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tax practices may be difficult or even impossible to apply to such inter-affiliate 
transactions. This is especially the case where unique or high-value intangibles are 
concerned. There is a need to investigate relevant, creative and flexible solutions to 
this issue. 
 
This paper will look at the problems inherent in dealing with the transfer pricing of 
intangible assets in the context of the uncertainties and challenges surrounding the 
taxation of such assets in a changing world.  Certain measures taken by the US and 
Australian revenue authorities, countries at the forefront of this rapidly evolving area 
of taxation law, along with views expressed in the OECD's Transfer Pricing 
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations (the OECD 
Guidelines) will be examined on a comparative basis. 
 
 
REVENUE AUTHORITIES ARE NOW FOCUSING ON 
INTANGIBLE ASSETS 
 
One of the factors linked to the more effective operation of transnational businesses, 
and hence to the growth of related-party trade in both volume and scope, is the 
increasing role of valuable intangibles in the economy.4 The OECD Guidelines cite 
one of the reasons for the rise of the multinational enterprise (MNE) in the global 
economy over the last twenty years to be technological progress.5 Studies reveal that 
international production is presently carried out by at least 61,000 MNEs with over 
900,000 foreign affiliates, representing foreign direct investment of about US$ 7 
trillion.6 
 
Transfer pricing in an international taxation context in essence refers to the division of 
intra-group profits (or losses) where members of a multinational group are jointly 
responsible for those profits (or losses). The scope for disagreement on this profit 
                                                          
4 Robert Turner, Ernst and Young, Toronto, Study on Transfer Pricing Working Paper 96-10 Prepared 
for the Technical Committee on Business Taxation, December 1996, p.1.  
5 OECD Guidelines Preface, para 1. 
6 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) World Investment Report 2004: 
The Shift Towards Services Overview p. 4. 
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division is considerable, as taxpayers and tax authorities might foreseeably have 
different perspectives on the appropriate amount of profit to be allocated to a 
particular member of the group in a specific country, and hence to the amount of tax 
payable there. This represents a major problem for MNEs, as they are expected 'from 
the standpoint of the respective tax authorities, to warrant the highest tax base 
possible to each and every country where they operate.'7 In these situations the MNE 
often suffers double taxation, i.e. the same income is included in the tax base by more 
than one tax administration, as each argues that they are entitled to it. The climate for 
controversy is heightened where intangible assets are concerned, due to their often 
unique nature, which necessitates negotiation and evaluation on a case-by-case basis.8 
According to the Australian Assistant Commissioner of Taxation - international 
strategies and operations, David Grecian, one of the big growth areas for transfer 
pricing is in intellectual property. 'Transfer pricing is easily the most complicated tax 
work. There is underpinning legislation, but you still have to make judgements on the 
commercial realities of what the taxpayers are actually doing.'9 
 
The arm's length standard is internationally recognised as the benchmark for 
determining the appropriate transfer price to be allocated to a transaction between two 
related parties. For example, in the United States, the regulations to section 482 of the 
Internal Revenue Code, which embody the regulatory framework for dealing with 
transfer pricing provide that: 
 
'In determining the true taxable income of a controlled taxpayer, the standard to be applied in 
every case is that of a taxpayer dealing at arm's length with an uncontrolled taxpayer. A 
controlled transaction meets the arm's length standard if the results of the transaction are 
consistent with the results that would have been realized if uncontrolled taxpayers had 
engaged in the same transaction under the same circumstances (arm's length result). However, 
because identical transactions can rarely be located, whether a transaction produces an arm's 
length result generally will be determined by reference to the results of comparable 
transactions under comparable circumstances.'10  
                                                          
7  ICC Policy Statement Transfer Pricing Documentation: A case for international cooperation 
Document 180-46/1rev.9 FINAL p. 1.  
8 Paul Koenig ' Transfer pricing audits become more frequent' PricewaterhouseCoopers International 
Tax Review Australia April 2005, p. 1. 
9  David Grecian quoted in Mark Abernethy 'The Tangled Transfer Pricing Web' (May 2005) 76 
Charter Sydney p. 37. 
10 US Treasury Regulations Section 1.482-1(b)(1). 
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Although the arm's length standard seeks to ensure objectivity by treating affiliated 
enterprises as if they were independent enterprises dealing in the open market, and by 
evaluating intercompany prices charged accordingly, this is a somewhat fluid concept 
as the interpretation of what constitutes an acceptable arm's length price may differ 
from country to country. Furthermore, applying the arm's length standard is especially 
complex where comparability of assets is reduced due to the their different or unique 
nature, as is the case with intangible assets.  
 
A recent global transfer pricing survey has drawn attention to a changing focus on the 
part of tax authorities worldwide.11 Companies surveyed in 22 countries have revealed 
that although the type of transaction most commonly audited remains the sale of 
tangible goods, the percentage of such audits is decreasing.12 At the same time, the 
percentage of audits of intangible property is increasing. Transfer pricing practitioners 
have expressed the view that 'in future years, transfer pricing and the issues associated 
with intangible and intellectual property (referred to as "intangibles") will be higher 
on the radar screen of tax authorities than ever before.'13  
 
In the US, transfer pricing experts are predicting an increasing focus by the IRS on 
international intangible asset transactions, as evidenced by the publication in 
September 2003 of new draft US regulations on the pricing of services and 
intangibles.14  One of the reasons these new regulations were proposed was to prevent 
taxpayers slipping valuable intangibles out of the United States as part of an 
integrated services transaction, but practitioners have commented that: 'Although the 
benefit of hindsight may clarify what transactions involve a disguised intangible 
transfer, taxpayers, rather than the IRS, may be the ambushed party.'15 
 
                                                          
11 Ernst and Young Transfer Pricing 2003 Global Survey: Practices, Perceptions and Trends in 22 
Countries Plus Tax Authority Approaches in 44 countries 12. 
12 Ibid Figure 5 - Type of Transactions Audited (Parents). 
13  Ernst and Young, International Tax Services Transfer Pricing Brief  'Tax authorities closely 
watching intangibles in the transfer pricing context' 8 June 2004, p.1. 
14 68 Frd. Reg. 53448. 
15 Thomas M. Zollo, Christopher P. Bowers and Jeffrey P. Cowan Jr. 'Transfer Pricing for Services: 
The New Wave Hits' 82 Taxes Chicago Jan 2004 p.34. 
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The current GlaxoSmithKline legal challenge to transfer pricing adjustments made by 
the IRS - including USD 1.9 billion in adjusted royalty payments for licensed patents 
and other marketing intangibles - has further highlighted the significance of related-
party intangible asset transactions. The main issue here is the contention by the IRS 
that the company undervalued the importance that marketing intangibles played in the 
promotion of drugs in the US, while at the same time overstating the importance of 
research and development (R&D) and marketing performed in the UK. The Australian 
Taxation Office (ATO) has also recently been reported as experiencing a renewed 
interest in intellectual property transactions, specifically in relation to marketing 
intangibles and to the arm's length nature of royalties paid and received.16 
 
 
THE NEW ECONOMY 
 
One of the reasons for an increased focus by revenue authorities on intangible asset 
transactions is the change that has occurred in the way that developed economies 
operate in the twenty-first century. Companies that once invested primarily in 
'tangible' physical assets such as plant and machinery, farm land and mineral 
resources are now investing in intangible assets such as brand names, human capital, 
intellectual capital and R&D. Although intangibles are not a new phenomenon, 
economic forces have propelled intangible assets into becoming the key drivers and 
major determinants of economic growth and business success: 
 
'The competitive atmosphere of the global marketplace has compelled MNEs to focus on 
continuous innovation, achieved by means of massive investment in intangible assets. A 
further contributing factor to this surge in the importance of intangibles in global trade is the 
rise of information technologies, especially the Internet.'17 
 
As a result, many successful MNEs such as Coca-Cola and Ford are divesting 
themselves of their physical assets in order to concentrate on intangible assets.18 
Pharmaceutical giants such as Merck and Co., and Pfizer, Inc. 'have prospered not 
                                                          
16 Koenig, above n 7, p.1. 
17 Michelle Markham The Transfer Pricing of Intangibles (Kluwer Law International, The Hague, 
2005) Chapter 1.  
 6
because they have built new factories for manufacturing and packaging pills, but 
because they have been technological leaders, spending substantial amounts on 
research and development to develop new pharmaceuticals.'19 An extreme example of 
a successful 'New Economy'-type corporation is Microsoft Corp., which at the end of 
September 2000 had only USD 1.9 billion in property and equipment while its market 
capitalisation was around USD 328 billion.20  Research has confirmed that 'brand 
development, e-commerce and the sale and consumption of products embodying 
intellectual property are overtaking the sale of commodities as a proportion of world 
trade.' 21  Investment in intangibles has thus become a fundamental source of 
continuing profitability and increased market share for leading international 
corporations. 
 
In Australia, the ATO's traditional approach of focusing on the use of intangible 
property by Australian subsidiaries of foreign MNEs, and thus on whether royalties 
paid were above what would be paid under an arm's length consideration, has changed 
with the realisation that Australia is increasingly exporting Intellectual Property (IP). 
This change in direction has been confirmed by research performed by the Australian 
Trade Commission (Austrade) 22 , which demonstrates that there has been strong 
growth in the number of Australian knowledge-based exporters, especially in 
businesses specialising in education, professional services and medium to high 
technology-based manufacturing.23  It is anticipated that the ATO will now begin 
requiring Australian taxpayers to demonstrate that they are being adequately 
compensated for the local development and ownership of valuable intangible property 
where access to such property is granted to related foreign associates.  
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
18 Ibid Chapter 3.3.1. 
19 Blair and Wallman, above n 2, p. 1. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Jill McKeough, Andrew Stewart and Philip Griffith Intellectual Property in Australia (Lexis Nexis 
Butterworths, Australia, 3rd edition, 2004) p. 605. 
22  The Australian Trade Commission (Austrade) is the Australian Government agency that helps 
Australian companies win overseas business for their products and services by reducing the time, cost 
and risk involved in selecting, entering and developing international markets. 
23 Tim Harcourt, Chief Economist, Australian Trade Commission, Sydney 'Knowledge exports for a 
knowledge economy' Friday 15 November 2002, p.2. 
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PROBLEMS IN DEFINING AND VALUING INTANGIBLE 
ASSETS 
 
There are inherent challenges for taxpayers and tax authorities alike in dealing with 
the transfer pricing of intangibles, due in part to the elusive qualities of these assets in 
an increasingly knowledge-based economy: 
 
'By their nature, intangibles are harder to measure, to quantify, to manage - harder even to 
define - than tangibles… there is no common language for talking about intangible sources of 
value, and what language there is tends to be ad hoc and descriptive rather than quantitative 
and concrete, making comparisons from one institutional situation to the next impossible.' 24 
 
In the United States, an attempt has been made in the final regulations of section 482 
to define as intangible any asset falling into one of six broad categories which has 
substantial value independent of the services of any individual.25  Although many 
types of intangible are directly listed, such as patents, inventions, designs, copyrights, 
trademarks, brand names, franchises and methods, and a catch-all category of 'any 
other similar item' that derives its value from its intellectual content rather than its 
physical attributes has been included, this list is not exhaustive, and clearly falls short 
of including some of the less traditionally recognisable forms of intangibles, such as 
human capital intangibles. 
 
In looking at what constitutes intangible property, the OECD Guidelines concentrate 
on business rights, ie. on intangible property associated with commercial activities.26 
They classify such commercial intangibles into two main categories, namely trade and 
marketing intangibles.27 Trade intangibles encompass patents, know-how, designs and 
models, while marketing intangibles are defined as a special type of commercial 
intangible including trademarks, trade names, customer lists and distribution channels 
as well as unique names, symbols or pictures with important promotional values. 
                                                          
24 Ibid p. 2. 
25 US Treasury Regulations Section 1.482-4(b). 
26 OECD Guidelines para. 6.2. 
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Unfortunately, problems arise even within these broad definitions, as the OECD 
Guidelines acknowledge 'know-how' to be an imprecise concept, which may include 
secret processes or formulae or other secret information that is not covered by 
patent.28 A further complication is that know-how and trade secrets can be either trade 
intangibles or marketing intangibles, 29  and it can also be difficult to distinguish 
income arising from trade intangibles from that arising from marketing intangibles.30  
 
In Australia, Division 13 of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 ('ITAA') deals with 
transfer pricing in terms of international agreements and the determination of the 
source of certain income. Section 136AA(1), which deals with definitions pertaining 
to this Division, does not contain a specific reference to intangibles. The closest 
definition refers to 'property', which includes a chose in action, any estate, interest, 
right or power, whether at law or in equity, in or over property, and any right to 
receive income and services. 
 
There is currently no global definition of intangibles, and thus in a multinational 
context problems can arise where intangibles are differently defined in different 
jurisdictions. This lack of clarity is exacerbated by the fact that as industries in the 
new economy have become more knowledge-intensive, there has been a wider 
recognition of less traditional forms of intangibles, including human capital 
intangibles, advertising slogans, business models or strategies as well as unique 
business cultures and philosophies. It is evident that national definitions have failed to 
keep pace with the continual changes and extensions to what formerly were defined as 
intangibles. 
 
An Australian Government Consultative Committee on Knowledge Capital 
(AGCCKC) paper on knowledge capital and the management of intangibles postulates 
that intangibles can best be defined by separating them into two categories: so-called 
                                                                                                                                                                      
27 Ibid para.6.3. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid para. 6.5. 
30 Ibid para. 6.12. 
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'hard' and 'soft' intangibles.31 According to this definition, hard intangibles encompass 
information protected by law, such as trademarks as well as non-accounting value 
evidenced by financial transactions such as goodwill. Soft intangibles on the other 
hand include knowledge assets, i.e. 'what people know', relationship assets, i.e. 'who 
people know', emotional assets, i.e. 'motivation levels' and time assets, i.e. 
'effectiveness levels'. While this may be a simple and useful categorisation, 
organisations have not necessarily kept abreast of the changing forms that intangibles 
may take. 'Currently, people are aware of hard intangibles and often fail to understand 
soft intangibles exist. That is even more problematic when 90 per cent of intangibles 
are soft intangibles.'32 
 
Measuring or valuing intangibles is also an area fraught with difficulty. Accounting 
practice in relation to intangibles, especially in a new economy populated by 
intangible-rich companies, is generally acknowledged to be in need of reform on a 
worldwide basis. Peter Fritz, the chair of the AGCCKC, believes the central problem 
to be an entirely outdated methodology of intangible valuation that has no place in the 
21st century. He has dismissed the impending rollout of the International Financial 
Reporting Standards (IFRS) in Australia by stating: 'Reporting intangible assets is an 
issue the accounting profession has walked away from'.33  
 
With the adoption of International Accounting Standards for Australia from 1st of 
January 2005, the new Standard 138 of the Australian Accounting Standards Board 
(AASB)34 has changed the reporting and accounting for intangible assets in Australia 
in that self-developed brands, mastheads, publishing titles, customer lists and similar 
items will no longer be recognised as intangible assets. One of the many concerns 
raised by this change is that it will: 
 
'result in a derecognition of many existing intangible assets. It essentially ignores how self-
generated or homegrown brands, as opposed to acquired brands, can create shareholder value 
                                                          
31 AGCCKC paper on knowledge capital and the management of intangibles written by Chris Liell-
Cock and Dr Ken Stanfield, referred to by Tamara Plakalo in 'Accounting for the uncountable' 
February 11 2005 http://ww.smh.com.au/technology/  
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid. 
34 The Australian equivalent of International Accounting Standard 38 (IAS 38). 
 10
and prohibits the recognition of other internally generated intangibles, such as human capital 
intangibles, as assets.'35 
 
The disconcerting effect of this new standard is that, in an era in which investors are 
clamouring for more detailed information on intangible assets, the reporting of certain 
internally generated intangibles will actually disappear from financial statements. 
Likewise, the US Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) does not require the 
valuation of internally generated intangibles.  The problem is a worldwide one: while 
companies are investing heavily in intangible assets, there is a dearth of financial 
reporting of such assets. 
 
'Microsoft considers software development, its core competence, as an expense and writes it 
off in the year incurred. English football clubs do not include the value of their players in their 
accounts. Reuters, the leading electronic information provider, acknowledges that its balance 
sheet does not include the global databases of financial information or its software and other 
intellectual property.'36 
 
One of the reasons why many accountants refuse to include certain intangible assets in 
published financial statements is that they are inherently different to tangible assets. 
Intangible assets are often heterogeneous, defying comparability. One hour of 
software programming does not necessarily equal another hour 37 , while 'in the 
pharmaceutical industry only one in 4000 synthesised compounds ever makes it to 
market and only 30% of those recover their development costs.'38 Human capital 
intangibles are especially difficult to measure. While the potential output contribution 
of a new computer may be quantified, the contribution of a new computer 
programmer is less easily measured.  
 
Thus by comparison with tangible assets, intangible assets are highly unpredictable. 
Intangibles do not follow standard depreciation rules. Some depreciate rapidly, some 
                                                          
35 Markham, above n 16, Chapter 3.3.3. 
36 Charles Goldfinger 'Foundations of the Knowledge Economy: Shift to the Intangible' (in German) 
Contribution to the Practical Manual of Knowledge Management (Praxishandbuch 
Wissensmanagement) SymposionVerlag in November 2002, p. 4. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid p. 5. 
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appreciate with age ('like a good wine'39) and others experience ebbs and flows in 
their lifecycles. While accounting rules are designed to record discrete and sequential 
transactions, the value created by investments in intangibles is often contextual and 
dependent on complementary investments in other intangibles, for example the value 
of a brand may depend on patent rights to some underlying technology or on a 
creative advertising program.40 Moreover, a so-called '"failure" in an R&D program 
might lead to insights that interact with the findings from another program and end up 
creating value in unexpected ways.'41 
 
Another complication is that intangibles may frequently be 'bundled' with, or 
'embedded' in tangible assets, for example, where a new technological process is 
incorporated into a machine.  These interactions can also pose challenges to the 
valuation of intangibles, as the disaggregation of the tangible and intangible 
components of an item may be required by revenue authorities 
 
In a changing world where transfers of technology across national boundaries are on 
the increase, there is a need for a broad, flexible and globally harmonised definition of 
intangibles in order to promote the free flow of investment. As far as the valuation of 
intangibles is concerned, in the US Professor Baruch Lev has called for the 
standardisation of intangibles-related information by an appropriate policymaking 
body such as the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB). 42  He has also 
proposed an information system known as the Value Chain Blueprint, which evaluates 
the fundamental economic processes of innovation from the discovery of new 
intangibles, their development and implementation and ultimately their 
commercialisation. 43  
 
In Australia, the AGCCKC have stated that what is needed to deal with the 
widespread move towards investment in intangibles in the new economy is a set of 
global, comprehensive, tested and accepted standards for financially valuing, 
                                                          
39 Ibid p. 4. 
40 Blair and Wallman, above n 2, p. 20. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Baruch Lev Intangibles: Management, Measurement, and Reporting (Brookings Institution Press, 
Washington D.C., 2001) p. 121. 
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reporting and strategically managing all forms of intangibles. They have also 
highlighted the need for international awareness and cooperation vis-a-vis knowledge 
capital, and an ultimate goal of the worldwide recognition and agreement on the 
measurement of knowledge capital.44 
 
 
OTHER PROBLEMS IN RELATION TO THE TRANSFER 
PRICING OF INTANGIBLE ASSETS 
 
Ownership Issues 
 
In addition to the problems of defining and valuing intangible assets for transfer 
pricing purposes, numerous other problems have recently arisen in relation to such 
assets. There are different concepts of ownership of intangibles, ranging from bare 
legal ownership to economic ownership. The determination of the ownership of 
intangible assets is of great importance in relation to their international tax treatment, 
as generally the owner of such assets in a group situation is entitled to the income 
stream flowing from such assets. 
 
This is an area that lacks clarity across the US final transfer pricing regulations, the 
OECD Guidelines and Division 13 of the ITAA in Australia. Legal ownership is 
largely a matter of form, predicated on the legal registration of patents, trademarks, 
copyright and designs. Economic ownership, on the other hand, relates more to the 
substance of inter-affiliate relationships, in that the party bearing the greatest share of 
the costs of developing or enhancing the intangible (and likewise bearing the greatest 
risk should the item fail to deliver value) is deemed to be the owner. While economic 
ownership therefore relates to economic realities, applying legal ownership may lead 
to a haphazard treatment of intangibles, as proprietary rights strategies vary not only 
among different countries but also among different MNEs.45  
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
43 Baruch Lev  'What then must we do?' in John Hand and Baruch Lev (eds) Intangible Assets Values, 
Measures and Risks (Oxford University Press 2003) p.514. 
44 Plakalo, above n 30, p. 3. 
45 Markham, above n 16, Chapter 3.2.1. 
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When the final transfer pricing regulations were issued in 1994, a radical change in 
the treatment of intangibles was introduced in that legal ownership was given 
precedence as far as legally protected intangibles such as patents were concerned 
(economic ownership is still applied where intangibles not legally protected, such as 
know how, are concerned). While this move has been criticised by practitioners, the 
IRS Proposed Section 482 regulations issued in September 2003 not only endorse the 
application of the legal ownership test, but also allow the IRS to impute legal 
ownership based on the perceived control of an intangible asset.46 Unfortunately, 'the 
language of the proposed regulations in this case gives the IRS broad discretion to 
recharacterize related party transactions based on subjective judgements.' 47  These 
proposed changes to the determination of the income attributable to an intangible have 
produced further uncertainty, as 'the control standard indicated may not necessarily 
point to a single owner in all cases.'48 
 
The OECD Guidelines do not specify whether a legal or an economic ownership test 
should be applied to intangible assets for transfer pricing purposes, which has led to 
conflicting interpretations as to which ownership test they endorse. The Australian 
legislation is likewise silent on this point. While 'the economic ownership test appears 
to be the yardstick most closely aligned with economic realities'49  it now seems 
unlikely that this test will be globally applied. 
 
 
Transfer Pricing Methodology Issues 
 
Revenue authorities in the United States and in Australia favour so-called traditional 
transaction methods for determining whether the transfer prices charged between 
related entities in a group situation comply with the arm's length standard. These 
methodologies, which have also been endorsed by the OECD Guidelines, focus on the 
comparability of the intangible transaction under review with intangible transactions 
conducted by independent, or non-related enterprises. However, given the unique 
                                                          
46 Proposed US Treasury Regulations Section 1.482-4(f)(4)(i). 
47  Ken Wood and David Canale 'IRS proposes new rules for intra-group activities' (Mar 2004) 
International Tax Review London p.1.  
48 Markham, above n 16, Chapter 3.2.3.  
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nature of intangible property, problems arise when attempting to conduct a 
comparative analysis.  
 
The OECD Guidelines acknowledge that intangible property may have a 'special 
character' 50  which complicates the search for comparables, and that even where 
business activities are deemed to be sufficiently similar to generate the same profit 
margin, a minor difference in the property transferred could materially affect the price, 
necessitating adjustments. 51   In the United States, the use of transaction-based 
methodologies in relation to intangible asset transactions is restricted to the 
Comparable Uncontrolled Transaction, or CUT method. This method involves an 
evaluation of whether or not the amount charged for a controlled, or independent, 
transfer of intangible property was at arm's length by examining the amount charged 
in a comparable uncontrolled transaction.52 The US Treasury Regulations make it 
clear that for this methodology to be reliably applied, the intangible being transferred 
in the uncontrolled transaction should be 'the same' as the intangible under 
consideration, and be transferred under the same, or substantially the same 
circumstances.53  
 
The US CUT method corresponds to the OECD Comparable Uncontrolled Price, or 
CUP method, which is designated for use in evaluating intangible transactions in 
Australian transfer pricing rulings.54 In the Australian context the term 'comparable' 
has been stated to mean 'the same as, similar to or analogous'. 55  The ATO has 
admitted that ascertaining an arm's length consideration is often 'extremely difficult' in 
practice, and that this difficulty is exacerbated where intangible property is concerned 
- or indeed where any property that is unique or highly differentiated is involved.56 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
49 Ibid Chapter 3.2.2. 
50 OECD Guidelines para. 6.13. 
51 Ibid para. 2.8.  
52 US Treasury Regulations Section 1.482-4(c). 
53 Ibid Section 1.482-4(c)(2)(ii). 
54 See for example TR 97/20 'Income tax: arm's length transfer pricing methodologies for international 
dealings.' 
55 TR 94/14 'Income tax: application of Division 13 of Part III (international profit shifting) - some 
basic concepts underlying the operation of Division 13 and some circumstances in which section 136 
AD will be applied' para. 353. 
56 Ibid para. 355. 
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The unique nature of intangible property has meant that other, less traditional, transfer 
pricing methodologies have become more relevant in ascertaining the arm's length 
nature of transactions involving such assets. Profit-based methodologies are seen by 
revenue authorities as being less closely aligned to the arm's length principle than 
traditional methods. Profit-split methodologies in turn are viewed with special caution, 
as they are deemed to incorporate an element of apportionment. They also rely, at 
least in part, on internal data rather than on independent comparable transactions.57 
For example, the US residual profit split method attempts to allocate the combined 
operating profit or loss from a business activity by first allocating income to the 
routine contributions of the parties in the controlled group using comparables, and 
then allocating or apportioning the residual profit remaining on the assumption that 
this profit is attributable to nonroutine intangible property contributed to the activity 
by the controlled taxpayers.  
 
The main criticism of the US residual profit split method is that this second step does 
not necessarily involve comparables, as the IRS acknowledges that external market 
benchmarks may not be available. Although this methodology has been seen as a 'last 
resort', there now seems to be some acceptance of the fact that where there are no 
comparable transactions, it may be more practical to focus on the profits actually 
earned, rather than on the hypothetical profits that ought to have been earned at arm's 
length in such a situation.  The ATO has conceded that while profit split 
methodologies are a less direct way of applying the arm's length principle, they may 
be 'most appropriate for cases where a more direct comparability on price or profit 
margin is not possible or practicable.'58 Other OECD countries such as Canada also 
seem to have become more open to the idea that profit split methodologies can 
provide the best means of achieving a result in keeping with the arm's length principle 
where non-routine intangibles are involved and hence good quality comparable 
transactions are not available.59  
 
  
                                                          
57 Markham, above n 16, Chapter 4.6.1. 
58 TR 94/14 above n 54, para. 349. 
 16
 
 
 
Transfer Pricing Penalties and Audits 
 
Bearing in mind the problems described above with the definition, valuation, 
ownership and transfer pricing methodologies to be applied to inter-affiliate intangible 
asset transactions, it is foreseeable that difficulties can arise when MNEs seek to 
provide revenue authorities with the required contemporaneous  (ie accurate, up-to-
date and detailed) documentation regarding such transactions.  This is especially the 
case as the trend among these taxing authorities worldwide in recent years has been to 
introduce more onerous documentation requirements coupled with increasing 
penalties for any inadequacies in the information provided. Australia and the US were 
the first two countries to introduce transfer pricing documentation rules in the mid-
1990s,60 and since then, many more countries have followed suit, seeking to ensure 
that they secure or increase what they regard as their 'fair' share of an MNE's taxable 
income. 
 
Where MNEs engage in cross-border transactions involving intangibles, they have to 
deal with the problem that: 'Tax compliance practices are developed according to each 
country's own domestic legislation and administrative procedures, therefore each 
country enforces its own specific documentation rules and regulations, as well as its 
own particular penalties for non-compliance.' 61 The OECD Guidelines do not provide 
guidance with regard to specific transfer pricing documentation requirements, and 
countries have enacted diverse administrative procedures which may differ 
substantially from country to country.   
 
In Australia, for example, transfer pricing penalties range from 50% of the tax 
avoided where the arrangement was deemed to be entered into for the sole or 
dominant purpose of reducing or eliminating tax, to 25% of such tax where the 
                                                                                                                                                                      
59 See Canada Revenue Agency APA Program Report 2003-2004 Table 5, which demonstrates the 
profit split method to be the predominant transfer pricing methodology used in Canadian Advance 
Pricing Agreements. 
60 Ernst and Young Transfer Pricing 2003 Global Survey, above n 10, p. 8. 
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taxpayer had a reasonably arguable position. In other cases, 25% of the tax avoided 
must be paid as a penalty, or 10% where the taxpayer has a reasonably arguable 
position. Unfortunately, no definition of what may or not be 'reasonably arguable' is 
provided, nor does the ATO  specify the extent of the documentation they require, or 
even a checklist of documentation that is desirable. Instead, it states that it 'does not 
expect taxpayers to prepare or obtain documents beyond the minimum needed to 
make a reasonable assessment of whether they have complied with the arm's length 
principle in setting prices or consideration.'62  This 'minimum' will of course vary from 
taxpayer to taxpayer, as each business will need to be evaluated according to its own 
individual facts and circumstances, including whether or not it participates in 
intercompany transfers of intangible property. The ATO recommends that taxpayers 
should use their commercial judgment according to what a prudent business person 
would do in such circumstances.63 The onus is thus on the taxpayer to supply all the 
necessary documentation on intrafirm transactions, and ensure compliance with the 
arm's length principle. If the documentation supplied by the MNE is incomplete, it 
will find it difficult to avoid the imposition of penalties.  
 
In the absence of any real guidelines as to the extent and depth of documentation 
required, it is perhaps no surprise to discover that most companies do not meet 
revenue documentation requirements. A clarification of the ATO's documentation 
requirements would greatly assist taxpayers to avoid penalties imposed due to 
deficient documentation.64 
 
In the United States, on the other hand, transfer pricing penalties range from 20% to 
40% of the amount of tax that has been underpaid.65 The transactional penalty applies 
to valuation misstatements falling outside a certain 'safe harbour' range, which also 
result in an underpayment of tax. Here, penalties may be avoided even if a transaction 
falls outside this range, if the taxpayer can show reasonable cause and good faith.66 
                                                                                                                                                                      
61 Markham, above n 16, Chapter 6.1.  
62 ATO document Schedule 25A instructions 2003, Item 4 Adequacy of documentation p. 7. 
63 Ibid. 
64 Markham, above n 16, Chapter 6.3. 
65 See US Internal Revenue Code Sec. 6662. 
66 See US Treasury Regulations Section 1.6664-4 Reasonable cause and good faith exception to section 
6662 penalties. Section 1.6664(c)(1) states 'no penalty shall be imposed under this part with respect to 
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Once again, what may constitute reasonable cause and good faith is not defined, and 
requires a case-by-case determination.67 The net adjustment penalty applies if the net 
section 482 transfer price adjustments for the year exceed certain thresholds. Having 
reasonable cause for the transfer price is not enough here, and there is no good faith 
exception to the imposition of the net adjustment penalty, increasing the likelihood of 
its imposition. 
 
In addition to the increasing compliance burden, the risk of a transfer pricing audit is 
high in both Australia and in the United States. The ATO will, as a matter of principle, 
review transfer pricing as part of a taxpayer's tax audit or risk review.68 Intangibles 
(both Australian and foreign owned) have been recently reported as receiving 
particular attention.69 Each year transfer pricing audits result in hundreds of millions 
of dollars' worth of tax and penalties being levied.70 Likewise, the IRS is known for 
extensively regulating transfer pricing71, and, as mentioned above, on increasingly 
focusing on intangible asset transactions.  
 
With transfer pricing remaining the 'most significant international tax issue facing 
international business today, and in the foreseeable future72, and with intangible assets 
becoming vitally important to a multitude of businesses in the global marketplace, 
controversy management is emerging as a key priority for MNEs. 
                                                                                                                                                                      
any underpayment if it is shown that there was a reasonable cause for such portion and that the 
taxpayer acted in good faith with respect to such portion.'  
67 See Internal Revenue Manual, IRM 120.1 A. Reasonable cause: '1.Reasonable cause is based on all 
the facts and circumstances in each situation and allows the Service to provide relief from a penalty 
that would otherwise be assessed. Reasonable cause relief is generally granted when the taxpayer 
exercises ordinary business care and prudence in determining their tax obligations but is unable to 
comply with those obligations.' 
68 Ernst and Young Transfer Pricing Global Reference Guide May 2005 p.7. In addition, the Ernst and 
Young Transfer Pricing 2003 Global Survey revealed that while 33% of parent corporations surveyed 
globally perceived intangibles to be particularly susceptible to transfer pricing disputes with revenue 
authorities, for Australia this figure rose to 48%. See: Ernst and Young 'Transfer Pricing 2003 Global 
Survey' Transfer Pricing Brief 7 November 2003 p. 2. 
69 Ibid. 
70 In the 2003-04 financial year, transfer pricing audits by the ATO raised AUD 868.5 million in tax 
and penalties, while AUD 157.3 million in losses were disallowed. See: Peter Murphy, Transfer Pricing 
Practice, International Strategy and Operations, ATO, 'Transfer Pricing And The ATO's Compliance 
Program 2004-5' presented at KPMG Transfer Pricing Seminars, Sydney and Melbourne, October 2004.  
71 A recent study by the US Treasury Department has confirmed that following an internal directive 
issued in January 2003 requiring auditors to request transfer pricing documentation in all audits with 
international transactions, requests for such documentation in audits rose from 35% to 55% in the 
audits studied. See: Sean Foley, KPMG, 'US Outbound: IRS targets transfer pricing compliance' 
(December/January 2005) International Tax Review International Updates p. 1.  
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CONTROVERSY MANAGEMENT: THE MUTUAL 
AGREEMENT PROCEDURE 
 
The Mutual Agreement Procedure (MAP), as enshrined in Article 25 has been a part 
of the OECD Model Income Tax Convention since it was first issued in 1963. It is a 
controversy management procedure whereby revenue authorities which disagree on 
the amount of tax to be levied on an MNE in a particular jurisdiction can consult in 
order to resolve their dispute, if they are linked by a double taxation agreement (DTA) 
which provides for such a conference.  
 
The rationale for the MAP is the avoidance of double taxation, a situation where the 
same income is taxed twice by different revenue authorities. Here the corresponding 
adjustment mechanism seeks to even out the increases in the amount of tax levied by 
one jurisdiction according to the arm's length principle (the primary adjustment) by a 
corresponding downward adjustment to the tax liability of the MNE in another 
jurisdiction. It is immediately evident that tax administrations may be reluctant to 
forfeit what they regard as their fair share of taxation in order that another tax 
administration may obtain a larger portion of such tax.  
 
While the avoidance of double taxation is a worthwhile aim, the procedure is 
notoriously lengthy. According to a transfer pricing expert: 
 
'The company that has operations in Australia and the US just wants to get on with business. 
But if, say, the Australian Taxation Office (ATO) says it wants more of the profits booked in 
Australia, a company can get caught between two governments and that's not a good place to 
be. These disputes can drag on for 10 years.'73 
 
At present tax administrations are under no compulsion to seek a resolution to their 
dispute under the MAP. This is because Article 25 simply instructs competent 
                                                                                                                                                                      
72 Ernst and Young Transfer Pricing 2003 Global Survey above n 10, p. 4. 
73 Stephen Breckenridge, Baker and McKenzie, quoted in Abernethy, above n 8, p. 36. 
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authorities (the treaty country representatives) to 'endeavour to resolve' such disputes - 
they are under no compulsion to do so. Taxpayers have further criticised the lack of 
transparency and lack of taxpayer involvement in the procedure. 
 
Related-party intangible asset transactions are particularly susceptible to disputes 
between the taxing jurisdictions involved. This is evidenced by the GlaxoSmithKline 
case referred to above, where the issues are so complex that two historically 
cooperative tax authorities, the UK Inland Revenue and the IRS, were unable to reach 
an agreement under the mutual agreement procedure and a tax court petition has now 
been filed by the US subsidiary of GlaxoSmithKline PLC.  
 
The IRS has acknowledged the complex nature of intangible asset transactions in an 
agreement they signed in June 2005 with the Canada Revenue Agency (CRA). This 
agreement sets out principles and guidelines to improve the performance and 
efficiency of the MAP under the Canada - US DTA. It lists seven examples of transfer 
pricing issues that these two competent authorities have failed to resolve to date, 
including the determination of an arm's-length value for non-routine intangible assets 
and the characterisation of a transaction as a service agreement or a licensing of 
intangible assets.  
 
In Australia, the ATO's Assistant Commissioner David Grecian has summed up the 
situation as follows: 'There are no vanilla cases; you're dealing with intangibles and 
you're dealing with other taxation authorities. We meet with the competent authorities 
on a set program called a mutual agreement procedure, but this is still a fine science. 
Everything is always changing.'74 
 
The OECD released a draft progress report entitled 'Improving the Process for 
Resolving International Tax Disputes' on July 27 2004, which offers some useful 
suggestions for reducing the number of cross-border tax disputes. A major 
recommendation has been the introduction of Supplementary Dispute Resolution 
(SDR) techniques such as mediation and arbitration on either an optional or 
                                                          
74 David Grecian quoted in Abernethy, above n 8, p. 38. 
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mandatory basis. Greater transparency and more efficient timeframes have also been 
advocated as necessary reforms. While this is a step in the right direction, no final 
decision as to the implementation of such reforms has yet been reached. 
 
The need to reform the MAP process has also been highlighted by the Pacific 
Association of Tax Administrators (PATA) issuing guidance to facilitate and support 
the resolution of MAP cases among PATA members (Australia, Japan, Canada and 
the United States) on June 25 2004. 75  While this guidance seeks to ensure the 
consistent and timely treatment of such cases, 76  and sets a two-year target for 
completion of PATA MAP cases, it does not modify the rules and procedures under 
the domestic law, policies, or procedures of the PATA members in relation to the 
MAP process. It creates no legal rights and obligations between the members. 
Whether this guidance will have a beneficial effect on MAP proceedings between 
PATA members remains to be seen, but the effect of a lack of compulsion to reach a 
mandatory resolution has already been noted. 
 
 
CONTROVERSY MANAGEMENT: ADVANCE PRICING 
AGREEMENTS 
 
An Advance Pricing Agreement (APA) is a formal agreement between the taxpayer 
and one or more revenue authorities on three basic issues: 
 
'(1) the factual nature of the intercompany transactions to which the APA applies; (2) an 
appropriate transfer pricing methodology (TPM) to apply to those transactions; and (3) the 
expected arm's length range of results form the application of the TPM to the transactions.'77 
 
The main advantage of an APA is that potential transfer pricing problems, such as the 
imposition of double taxation, can be addressed on a prospective basis. Australia 
signed the world's first APA with the United States in 1991, and both the IRS and the 
                                                          
75 MAP Operational Guidance for Member Countries of the Pacific Association of Tax Administrators. 
(PATA). 
76 Ibid Section 1 Purpose of Guidance. 
77 Ernst and Young Transfer Pricing 2003 Global Survey above n 10, p. 22. 
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ATO have promoted APAs as a cooperative venture78 which provides taxpayers with 
certainty as to the tax treatment of their international transfer pricing transactions, 
including inter-affiliate transfers of technology, for the period of the APA (usually 
three to five years in Australia, while the US favours five-year agreements). 
Australian companies are currently leading the global market on the use of APAs, and 
83 percent of those who had used an APA would consider doing so again.79 The Ernst 
& Young 2003 global transfer pricing survey revealed that while only 21 percent of 
US parent companies reported the use of an APA as a controversy management tool 
in 2003, 80 percent of US subsidiary companies that had used an APA intended to 
renew their APA.80 
 
Practitioners have expressed different viewpoints as to the suitability of using an APA 
for intangible asset transactions. Some feel that APAs may be too rigid for any 
industry undergoing constant change. The market for intangibles is of necessity a 
dynamic one, and it may be difficult to predict an expected arm's length range of 
results over a three-to-five year period.  
 
'What may have appeared to be an appropriate APA to use at the beginning of this period may 
change at some later point. There may be a need to update comparables, particularly in a field 
of enterprise (such as computer technology) where advances are constantly being made.'81  
 
Along these lines, a US practitioner has advised that while the APA process may be 
useful where straightforward issues such as routine intangibles are involved, there 
may be problems where controversial issues such as the allocation of income with 
respect to high-value intangibles need to be resolved.82 
 
However, another US transfer pricing analyst has commented that APAs may be 
especially beneficial where transactions involve unique or technologically 
                                                          
78 See the US Rev. Proc. 2004-40, Section 2: Principles Of The APA Program, section 2.01, and the 
ATO's publication Advance Pricing Arrangements NAT 2748-04.2005, p. 2.  
79 Ernst and Young 'Transfer Pricing 2003 Global Survey', above n 67, p. 2. 
80 Transfer Pricing 2003 Global Survey above n 10, p. 72. 
81 Markham, above n 16, Chapter 8.6.8. 
82 See the comments of Joel Williamson in R.E. Ackerman et al 'The Real World of Transfer Pricing 
Today' (Mar 1999) Taxes: The tax magazine p. 177. 
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sophisticated products or transfers of difficult-to-value intellectual property.83 The 
ATO likewise adopts the view that transactions involving transfers of intangible 
property are particularly suited to the APA process.84 
 
This view is borne out by the fact that APAs have addressed situations involving 
high-value intangibles.85 In the US in the 2004 calendar year, ten APAs dealing with 
the use of intangible property by a non-US entity were executed, along with six APAs 
dealing with the use of intangible property by a US entity. In Australia in the 2003-04 
tax year, 4 out of a total of 23 APAs completed involved intangibles.86 Like the IRS, 
the ATO encounters a range of APAs involving the inbound or outbound licensing of 
intangibles every year.87 
 
Perhaps one of the main advantages of using an APA where intangibles are 
transferred in cross-border inter-affiliate transactions and the risk of scrutiny by 
revenue, and hence the scope for controversy, is high is that a resolution can be 
reached relatively swiftly. 
 
'A taxpayer can avoid a time-consuming and expensive tax controversy with the IRS by 
entering into an APA. Because tax controversies have several phases (audit, appeals office 
consideration, litigation and, in some cases, competent authority consideration), many of the 
litigated transfer pricing cases have lasted 10 to 15 years from the audit phase through 
completion. Competent authority consideration alone may take five to seven years'.88  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
83 Geralyn M. Fallon 'Advance Pricing Agreements: Policy and Practice' (September 1995) Taxes 
Chicago  p. 493. 
84 TR 95/23 'Income tax: transfer pricing - procedures for bilateral and unilateral advance pricing 
arrangements' para.52 
85 See: Michael Durst, quoted in Robert E. Ackerman et al,  'The Real World of Transfer Pricing Today' 
(Mar 1999) Taxes: The tax magazine p. 177. 
86 ATO publication Advance Pricing Arrangement Program - Report on developments in 2003-04 
October 2004 NAT 12082-10.2004 Figure 6: APAs completed by subject. 
87 Ibid p.7. 
88 Geralyn M. Fallon 'Advance Pricing Agreements' (June 1997) 75 Taxes Chicago p. 307.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
The reality is that the transfer pricing of intangibles is an inherently complex issue, 
regardless of the type of controversy management employed in seeking a satisfactory 
outcome for both taxpayers and tax administrations. Successfully dealing with 
intercompany transactions involving intangibles is a difficult task for all parties to an 
APA, especially as at present there is no global definition of intangibles, and even 
national definitions have failed to keep pace with the continual changes and 
extensions to what were formerly defined as intangibles.  
 
The situation is further exacerbated by the fact that in many cases, intangibles are not 
reflected on the balance sheet of the taxpayer, and may even be disappearing from 
financial statements, making it more difficult to determine the value they have added 
to a transaction. In some cases, the bundling of tangible and intangible property can 
cause problems where these elements require disaggregation for tax purposes. The 
ATO has recognised these problems, stating: 
 
'we try to spend time ensuring that the intangibles are clearly identified before they are 
rewarded. We have found it necessary to clearly establish the existence and nature of the 
intangibles before attempting to attribute to them any value or take them into account in 
applying an arm's length methodology.'89 
 
Ownership issues also need to be resolved, especially the tension between 'legal' and 
'economic' ownership. In light of the changing stance towards ownership, especially 
in the US, MNEs need to carefully document and structure their related party 
transactions in order to avoid a group member being imputed with ownership in 
situations where this does not reflect the reality of the situation. 
 
Applying a traditional transactional methodology in order to determine the arm's 
length nature of an intangible asset transaction presents certain challenges, due to 
comparability issues in relation to their specialised nature. A solution here may be not 
only for revenue authorities to adapt to the proliferation of intragroup intangibles in 
                                                          
89 ATO publication Advance Pricing Arrangement Program - Report on developments in 2003-04, 
above n 85, p. 7. 
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the global economy by adopting a more flexible stance to the choice of transfer 
pricing methodology, but also to be innovative in devising new ways of dealing with 
dynamic enterprises subject to continual change. APAs may be an ideal vehicle for 
such innovation, as they have the ability to be tailor-made to suit individual fact 
scenarios. For example, the flexible profit split matrix developed in Australia a few 
years ago for an APA in the electronics industry was a world first.90 
 
There remains a necessity for both taxpayers and tax authorities to realise that 
significant changes are taking place in the global economic landscape, and that 
relevant, creative and flexible solutions are required to deal with the fact that 'the 
present and the future is no longer shaped by physical flows of material goods and 
products but by ethereal streams of data, images and symbols'.91  
 
If consensus can be reached between the key players involved in the international tax 
treatment of intangibles in the transfer pricing context that a new, cooperative and 
coherent approach is needed to meet the demands of a worldwide shift towards 
investment in technology, this has 'the potential to release more of the natural 
dynamism in the business sector to stimulate innovation and encourage global trade in 
intangible assets. This is turn can only benefit national governments. It is a path worth 
pursuing.'92 
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